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to revision. In purporting to safeguard citizens abroad by clothing
them with certain constitutional guarantees not substantially different
from those provided in the Uniform Code, the Supreme Court in the
Covert case has surrendered dependents of servicemen such as these
to the exclusive jurisdiction of foreign courts where the safeguards




In a criminal trial in a federal court a Government witness has
testified on direct examination. With a view towards impeaching the
witness' credibility, the defense asks for an order requiring the Govern-
ment to produce a prior statement made to the Government by the
witness regarding the subject of his testimony. Is there a right to have
such statements produced for defendant's inspection and use on
cross-examination?
The Supreme Court of the United States in Jencks v. United States'
answered in the affirmative. Jencks, a labor union officer, was indicted
for filing a false non-Communist affidavit with the National Labor Re-
lations Board.2 A trial in the District Court for the Western District
of Texas resulted in conviction. Prior to trial, Matusow and Ford, the
two chief Government witnesses, made certain statements to the F.B.I.
as to activities in which Jencks participated. After they had testified
against him on the trial, Jencks moved to direct the Government
to produce these reports for inspection and use in cross-examina-
tion. The Government opposed the motion upon the sole ground
that a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the contents
of the reports and the testimony of Matusow and Ford had not been
laid. The denial of this motion in the trial court was asserted as error
in an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, but the con-
viction was affirmed.3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari4 and ulti-
mately upset the conviction because of this error.
The majority opinion written by Justice Brennan dealt only with
:'353 U.S. 657 (1957).
-See Taft-Hartley Act § 9 (h), 6s Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 65 Stat. 6ol (1951),
29 U.S.C. § 15 9 (h) (1952).
'Jencks v. United States, 226 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1955).
'Jencks v. United States, 350 U.S. 980 (1956).
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a request to inspect prior statements of a Government witness after
he had testified during the trial. Much of the confusion and apprehen-
sion arising from the Jencks decision has been the result of a failure to
understand what the Court held. The situation should not be con-
fused with two other related, but distinguishable, phases of inspection
and discovery:
(1) The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure5 provide for a certain
degree of pre-trial discovery of evidentiary documents in the Govern-
ment's possession.0 An important case in this regard is Fryer v. United
States,7 wherein the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took
a broad view of the scope of the subpoena process under Rule 17(c).S It
was held that the trial court erred in quashing a subpoena whereby the
defendant sought to obtain for inspection prior to trial certain state-
ments made by him and also statements volunteered to the Govern-
ment by prospective witnesses. 9 Sanction was thus given in the Fryer
case to pre-trial discovery and inspection of statements made by po-
tential witnesses.10 The decision in Jencks, however, is concerned only
with disclosure which might arise during the course of the trial.11
(2) An established rule of evidence entitles a defendant to inspect,
for the purpose of cross-examination, any paper or memorandum used
Ted. R. Grim. P. 16; Fed. R. Grim. P. 17(c).
GThe cases have been in substantial disagreement as to the scope and purview
of both Rule 16 and Rule 17(c) and to the relation each bears to the overall scheme
of pre-trial disclosure. See, e.g., Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214
(1951); United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1956); Monroe v. United
States, 234 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144 (7th
Cir. 1955); Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v.
Pack, 146 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1956); United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); United States v. Schine, 16 F.R.D. 514 (W.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v.
Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D. D.C. 1954); United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248
(D. Mass. 1953); United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. i8o (W.D. Pa. 1952). See also
Notes, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 492 (1954); 6o Yale L.J. 626 (1951).
72o7 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1953).
6it should be noted that the Fryer case was a two-to-one decision, the dissenting
judge flatly disagreeing with the majority in its interpretation of Rule 17(c).
'207 F.2d at 137 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
'Because this decision involved a defendant indicted for first degree murder,
it was subsequently limited by the District Court for the District of Columbia to
cases involving capital offenses. United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D.
D.C. 1954). This limitation was also recognized in two other district courts. United
States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v. Bryson, 6
F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
"Although there are certain areas and aspects of similarity between them,
it has been recognized that a fundamental difference exists between pre-trial discov-
ery and disclosure during the trial. United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78
(.d Cir. 1944); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United
States v. Ward, 12o F. Supp. 57, 6o (S.D.N.Y. 1954)-
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by a witness to refresh his recollection while on the stand.12 This prob-
lem is also dissimilar to the factual situation in Jencks, where the re-
quest was to inspect the witness' prior statement with the aim of dis-
covering an inconsistency between that statement and the trial testi-
mony.
The question then arises as to the basis or authority for the de-
cision reached in Jencks. The mandate of the sixth amendment that
"the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor"'1 must be considered as a backdrop to
the basic problem.14 Furthermore, although neither the fifth amend-
ment nor the words "due process" were mentioned in the opinion,
it would seem that the fundamental atmosphere in which the decision
was reached was one of assurance to the federal criminal defendant of
due process of law.
The only previous Supreme Court decision involving this question
is Gordon v. United States,'5 which, in perhaps a slightly narrower
context, reached a conclusion consonant with the Jencks holding. As
a precedent, however, that case has often proved undesirable to defen-
dants who have relied upon it in seeking disclosure during the trial.
The defendant in the Gordon case had almost every factor in his
favor, and the Court, in ordering production, made it appear that
all of them were essential.' 6 Perhaps the chief stumbling block to a
"United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1946); Little v. United States,
93 F.2d 401, 406 (8th Cir. 1937); Brownlow v. United States, 8 F.2d 711 (9th Cir.
1925); Morris v. United States, 149 Fed. 123, 126 (5 th Cir. ,9o6); McCormick, Evi-
dence 17 (1954); Annot., 125 A.L.R. 19, 194-95 (1940). But see United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150, 233 (194o). There is some authority for extending this
proposition so as to make it applicable to writings used by the witness to refresh
his memory before he testifies. The Alpha, 44 F. Supp. 809, 8,5 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (civil
case); 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 762 (3d ed. 1940). Contra, Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942).
3U.S. Const. amend. VI.
'-"The court's discretionary power to compel production of a document in
the custody of a government agency must be exercised in the light of the require-
ment of the Sixth Amendment .... This constitutional mandate extends to docu-
mentary as well as oral evidence...." United States v. Schneiderman, io6 F. Supp.
731, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1952); accord, United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14692d, at
35 (C.C.D. Va. 18o7). See also United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7 th Cir.
1955).
'5344 U.S. 414 (1953).
1"By proper cross-examination, defense counsel laid a foundation for his
demand by showing that the documents were in existence, were in possession of
the Government, were made by the Government's witness under examination,
were contradictory of his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as
to revelant, important and material matters which directly bore on the main
issue being tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The demand
was for production of these specific documents and did not propose any broad
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defendant in obtaining disclosure was the recital in Gordon that the
defendant had shown an inconsistency between the witness' prior state-
ment and his trial testimony. This led lower federal courts to conclude
that such a showing of inconsistency was essential to production of
statements. 17 So interpreted, Gordon was often used to defeat a de-
fendant's motion for disclosure and inspection.' 8
Authority for the Supreme Court's ruling in the Jencks case may
also be found in several earlier federal court decisions. The earliest
recorded instance in which this problem came to light was during the
historic trial of former Vice-President Aaron Burr, presided over by
Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice. After the trial
had opened, but before the jury had been empaneled, the defense
moved for an order to compel the production of a letter then in cus-
tody of President Thomas Jefferson. The order was granted.19 A
century and a quarter later, in 1932, the disclosure problem came be-
fore the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Asgill v. United States.20
The Government's chief witness denied on cross-examination that
she knew the contents of certain letters, written by a third person on
her behalf, which contradicted her earlier testimony. The defendant
established that the letters had been dictated in the witness' presence,
and asked to have them produced. The trial court's refusal was re-
versible error, since a sufficient foundation had been laid to intro-
duce the letters for impeachment purposes. 21 In 1944, refusal to grant
or blind fishing expedition among documents possessed by the Government on the
chance that something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for
statements taken from persons or informants not offered as witnesses. The Govern-
ment did not assert any privilege for the documents on grounds of national security,
confidential character, public interest, or otherwise." Gordon v. United States, 344
U.S. 414, 418-19 (1953).
'TUnited States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812, 815 (7 th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Bookie, 229
F.2d i3o, 133 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861, 868 (7th Cir.
1956), rev'd Lightfoot v. United States, 355 U.S. 2 (1957); Scales v. United States,
227 F.2d 581, 592 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd 355 U.S. (1957); Jencks v. United States, 226
F.2d 540, 552 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Scanlon v. United States, 223
F.2d 382, 386 (ist Cir. 1955); United States v. Lebron, 222 F.ad 531, 537 (2d Cir.
1955); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 8o6, 814 (5th Cir. 1953).
"'United States v. Lightfoot, 228 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd Lightfoot v.
United States, 355 U.S. 2 (1957); Scanlon v. United Sta'tes, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.
1955); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 8o6 (5 th Cir. 1953).
'United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Gas. 30, No. 146 92d; 25 Fed. Cas. 187, No.
14694 (C.C.D. Va. 18o7).
2'6o F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1932).
-""It [the trial court's refusal] excludes the idea that lies at the bottom of
all cross-examination, to wit, that it is designed, not only to develop the facts of a
case, but to test the witness in matters of recollection, of prejudice or bias, and of
1958]
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the accused the right to inspect a prior inconsistent statement made by
a key Government witness was held by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Krulewitch2 2 to require reversal. The statement was held to be
admissible to contradict the witness' testimony, and since inspection
was said to be necessary to fulfill a procedural condition to its admis-
sion, it was proper for the accused to make such a demand.23 One
other opinion, clearly in point, in which disclosure of statements was
allowed during the trial is United States v. Schneiderman,24 a 1952
district court decision. The trial judge concluded, despite the Govern-
ment's assertion that the particular documents sought were confiden-
tial and therefore privileged, that it was nevertheless essential to the
defense that an order be entered for production thereof for use by the
defense in cross-examining the witness.25 In several scattered federal
court decisions in which the defendant has requested pre-trial pro-
duction of statements made by prospective witnesses, it has been said,
in denying the specific requests, that such disclosure will be, or should
be, made to the defendant after the witness has testified.26
truthful statement .... She was an important witness for the government, and the
defendant was entitled to the fullest opportunity to balance fact against fact, to
weigh the testimony previously given against the testimony in the instant case,
and, if possible, to ferret out every detail of the motive which induced her to
change her former testimony and to testify as she did against the defendant." Asgill
v. United States, 60 F.2d 776, 779 (4 th Cir. 1932).
21145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
231 n reaching this conclusion Judge Hand stated: "So far as we can find,
the question has never been ruled in a federal court." United States v. Krule-
witch, 145 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1944). The dissent in this case felt that the holding of
the court, "requiring the prosecution to deliver to the accused a statement from a
witness of which it had made no use, seems the making of new, even if desirable,
law, for prior federal holdings are pretty clearly against the requirement." United
States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion).
" 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
2-"[Jjustice requires that doubt be weighed in favor of the defense. How es-
sential the evidence may turn out to be raises a mere question of degree. If compe-
tent and relevant, and if material to any degree not clearly de minimis, both rea-
son and policy advocate that the defense should be entitled to compel produc-
tion of the evidence in fulfillment of the assurance of the Sixth Amendment...."
United States v. Schneiderman, io6 F. Supp. 731, 736 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
'United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1955); United States v.
Ward, 12o F. Supp. 57, 6o (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367,
371 (D. D.C. 1954); United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In
another case the District Judge ruled in a pre-trial order that the "United States
Attorney will be directed to exhibit to defense counsel at the trial after any wit-
ness is called and sworn in behalf of the Government, any and all written, signed
statements previously obtained by the Government from that witness." United
States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1954). There have also been cases
where defendant has appealed, thinking that he was entitled to a broader dis-
closure than that which the trial court had granted. United States v. Fontana, 231
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The basic holding of Jencks is that a defendant should be allowed
during the trial to inspect relevant prior statements made by witnesses
who testify against him. In so deciding, the Supreme Court clarified
four elements of the procedure to be followed in making this disclosure:
(i) To warrant inspection of a witness' prior statements the de-
fendant is not required to show that an inconsistency exists between
the trial testimony of the witness and the earlier statement. 27
Because of the reference in the Gordon case to the inconsistency
which the defendant had shown there, several lower federal courts
had held a showing of inconsistency to be requisite to the production of
a statement. 2s Justice Brennan pointed out that Gordon had been mis-
interpreted in that respect, and held such a requirement to be mani-
festly unjust.29 It was thus stated in the Court's opinion: "Requiring
the accused first to show conflict between the reports and the testimony
is actually to deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his
defense. The occasion for determining a conflict cannot arise until
after the witness has testified, and unless he admits conflict, as in
Gordon, the accused is helpless to know or discover conflict without
inspecting the reports. A requirement of a showing of conflict would
be clearly incompatible with our standards for the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts and must therefore be rejected."30
(2) Whereas inspection of prior statements had been thought earlier
to be a matter resting in the trial court's discretion,31 the Jencks de-
cision indicates that a defendant is so entitled as of right.
3 2
F.2d 807, 8o9 (3d Cir. 1956); Schneider v. United States, 192 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.
1951). See also Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. ig3).
'353 U.S. 657, 666-68 (1957). It was only in this respect that the concurring
opinion of Justice Burton, in which he was joined by Justice Harlan, agreed with
the majority opinion. "Although some federal courts have required a showing of
contradiction, this Court has never done so. A rule requiring a showing of contra-
diction in every case would not serve the ends of justice." Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 674 (1957) (concurring opinion).
*See note 17 supra.
-'This injustice seems to have been recognized in only one prior federal court
decision, which held that "the Government's contention that defendants are not
entitled to the reports because they have not shown that the reports contradict
Cvetic [the Government witness] is untenable. Defendants cannot show that the
reports contradict the witness unless they see them." United States v. Mesarosh, 166
F. Supp. 345, 350 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
-*Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1957).
"Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942); United States v. Roviaro,
229 F.2d 812, 815 (7 th Cir. 1956); Simmons v. United States, 22o F.2d 377, 378
(D.C. Cir. 1954); Neal v. United States, 2o3 F.2d iii, xi8 (5 th Cir. 1953); Kaufman
v. United States, 163 F.2d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 1947); United States v. Schneiderman,
io6 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Toner, 77 F. Supp. 908,
917 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
"353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957). The concurring justices hestitated to follow the ma-
1958]
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This aspect is not made perfectly clear in the majority opinion, but
may be inferred from the following language: "This Court held in
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132, that the trial judge had
discretion to deny inspection when the witness '... does not use his
notes or memoranda [relating to his testimony] in court....' We now
hold that the petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Govern-
ment to produce.... ,3
(3) The Court specifically disapproved the procedure whereby
the requested documents are submitted to the trial judge for his de-
termination of relevancy and materiality. Instead, these prior state-
ments-if "shown to relate to the testimony of the witness"-should
go directly to the defendant. The trial, judge will determine admis-
sibility only after inspection by the defendant.34
The pre-Jencks procedure enabled a trial judge to inspect the ma-
terial that a defendant sought in order to determine what benefit, if
any, it would afford in cross-examining the witness. Generally, this
judicial examination has resulted only in a refusal to allow a defen-
dant the use of the documents. 35 Thus, it was concluded in Jencks:
"Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the
jority on this point, preferring to retain the flexibility which necessarily results
from allowing the trial judge to utilize his discretion. See Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 674-75 (1957) (concurring opinion).
"Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957) (Emphasis added). This treat-
ment provoked the following comment from Justice Clark in dissent: "It seems to
me that proper judicial administration would require that the Court expressly
overrule Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942), which is contra
to the rule announced today. But that is not done. That case is left on the books
to haunt lawyers and trial courts in their search for the proper rule." Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657, 68o (1957) (dissenting opinion).
3'353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957). Neither the concurring opinion nor the dissent
could agree with this procedure. Justice Burton urged that when the question of
privilege is raised by the Government, it is "necessary for the trial court, before
disclosing the privileged material to the defendant, to pass on the question by ex-
amining in camera the portions claimed to be privileged." Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 676 (1957) (concurring opinion). The dissent of Justice Clark points
out that "Even the defense attorneys did not have the temerity to ask for such
a sweeping decision. They only asked that the documents be delivered to the judge
for his determination of whether the defendant should be permitted to examine
them." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 681 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
6,See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581, 592 (4 th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955); Shelton v. United States, 2o5 F.2d
8o6, 814 (Sth Cir. 1953); United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir.
1944); United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v.
Boehm, 123 F.2d 791, 807 (8th Cir. 1941). This is not universally true, for de-
fendant has been allowed inspection and use of documents examined, even after
the trial judge's preliminary examination. United States v. Schneiderman, io6 F.
Supp. 731, 737 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
CASE COMMENTS
effective use for purposes of discrediting the Government's witness
and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must ini-
tially be entitled to see them to determine what use may be made of
them. Justice requires no less."36
(4) Finally, it was ruled by the Court in Jencks that a refusal by
the Government to comply with an order to produce leaves the judge
no alternative except to dismiss the action.37
There is involved here a problem of governmental privilege. It
is conceded in the opinion that "the protection of vital national
interests may militate against public disclosure of documents in the
Government's possession." 3S The question naturally arises as to the
effect of the Government's refusal to produce certain documents which
it asserts are privileged. Should such a conflict arise between the in-
terests of the Government and the interests of the accused, it was
reasoned in Jencks that the defendant's rights could be preserved only
by dismissal of the action. Quoting from an earlier Supreme Court de-
cision, 39 Justice Brennan pointed out that "since the Government
which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is
done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and
then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of
anything which might be material to his defense .... ,,40
It seems clear that the holding of the Jencks case has been extended
and perhaps even misapplied by several of the courts which have
since been urged to follow its doctrine. There are basically two ways
in which the Court's ruling has been stretched: it has been con-
tended that the decision should apply as well to pre-trial discovery as
to disclosure during the trial, and there have been efforts to broaden
the scope of the documents sought to be produced for inspection. As to
the former, several successful attempts have been made to use Jencks as
a wedge to force open the door of pre-trial discovery to hopeful de-
fendants. 4' The rationale for this extension seems to be that if in-
spection may be allowed during the trial, it might just as well be
3jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957).
3353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957). It appears that the Court's ruling here was not
squarely met by either the concurring or the dissenting opinion.
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670 (1957).
'*United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
40Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957).
"United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp. 661 (W.D. Ky. 1957); United States v. Young,
unreported (S.D. Tex. 1957), 103 Cong. Rec. 14551-52 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957);
United States v. Apex Distributing Co., unreported (W.D. Wash. 1957), 103 Cong.
Rec. 14553 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957). But see United States v. Malizia, 154 F. Supp.
511, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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granted prior to trial, thereby avoiding unnecessary disruption of the
trial proceedings while the defendant inspects a statement.4 2 The argu-
ment against an expansion of Jencks is that the Supreme Court was
concerned only with the issue of the credibility of the witness at the
trial; 43 and since the Government generally need not determine its
witnesses in advance of trial,44 such a motion before a witness has
actually testified is premature.4 5
In the latter area of extension, defendants in several cases have pre-
vailed upon the court to order production of various classes of docu-
ments for which Jencks gives no apparent license. The order there in-
cluded only those "reports of Matusow and Ford in [the Government's]
possession, written and, when orally made, as recorded by the F.B.I.,
touching the events and activities as to which they testified at the
trial."46 In one case the defendant was denied the right to inspect cer-
"It was suggested by one court that the language of Jencks "entirely dissipates
any thought that the court must wait until the trial of the case and be actively en-
gaged in the trial before the requirement to produce the documents can be made.
There could be no reason for such a rule." United States v. Hall, 153 F. Supp.
661, 664 (W.D. Ky. 1957). Another court justified its decision to allow this type of
disclosure prior to trial by saying: "If the Government can be required to produce
statements of its witnesses after they have testified, there is no valid reason for not
requiring such production a reasonable time in advance of trial in order to permit
a defendant to use them in preparing his case." United States v. Apex Distributing
Co., unreported (W.D. Wash. 1957), 103 Cong. Rec. 14553 (daily ed. Aug 26, 1957).
""Indeed, the very touchstone of the Jencks decision is the issue of credibility
of the witness at the trial. Before the defense is entitled to disclosure of any state-
ments made by a Government witness for the purpose of discrediting him, the credi-
bility of the witness whose prior statements are sought must be in issue." United
States v. Benson, 2o F.R.D. 6o, 6o4-o5 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). "[T]he sole concern of the
Supreme Court in that case was the production to defense counsel of statements made
by the Government's witnesses to the F.B.I., to the end that the defense... might im-
peach the credibility of the witnesses on cross-examination. To this situation, and
this situation alone, is the Jencks decision applicable." United States v. Grado,
154 F. Supp. 878, 879 (W.D. Mo. 1957). See also United States v. Grossman, 154 F.
Supp. 813 (D. N.J. 1957); United States v. Vasquez, unreported (D. P.R. 1957),
1o3 Cong. Rec. 14553 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957).
"This is true at least in non-capital cases. United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D.
11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813, 815 (D. N.J.
1957); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 372 (D. D.C. 1954). However, 18 U.S.C. §
3432 provides: "A person charged with treason or other capital offense shall at least
three days before commencement of trial be furnished with a copy of the indictment
and a list of the veniremen, and of the witnesses to be produced on the trial for
proving the indictment, stating the place of abode of each venireman and witness."
"United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Mo. 1957); United States v.
Carr, 21 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. ii (S.D.N.Y.
1957); United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D. N.J. 1957); United States v.
Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1957); United States v. Anderson, 154 F. Supp. 374
(E.D. Mo. 1957); United States v. Benson, 2o F.R.D. 6o2 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
"Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957)-
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tan F.B.I. files relating to criminal records of the Government's wit-
nesses; 47 in a prosecution for refusing to submit to induction into
the armed forces, Jencks was held not to sanction the production of an
F.B.I. report dealing with the investigation of a conscientious object-
or's claim. 48 There have been instances, however, where access has
been granted, in reliance upon Jencks, to complete investigative re-
ports and files49 and to statements made before a grand jury.50
In addition, the Jencks case has recently been extended to apply
to proceedings before administrative boards. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia pointed out: "The question here is
whether production is one of the fundamentals of fair play re-
quired in an administrative proceeding. We think it is.... We think
simple justice, the fundamentals of fair play, require no less. The
opinion of the Supreme Court in the Jencks case, as we read it, is
based upon the elementary proposition that the interest of the United
States is that justice be done. The same elementary proposition applies
here and leads to the same result."5' 1
Because of the confusion emanating from the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Jencks and the extensions which have followed therefrom,
Congress last fall enacted a new law designed to change certain
aspects of the holding and otherwise to clarify it.52 The general ruling
of the case is preserved by the legislation, but of the opinion's four
procedural points, which were listed earlier, changes have been effected
in two. As to (i) and (2), Congress has allowed the Court's conclusions
to stand. Under the new statute, there is still no requirement that
inconsistency be shown, and production of prior statements remains a
17Simms v. United States, 248 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957). Contra, United States v.
Jacobson, 154 F. Supp. io3 (W.D. Wash. 1957).
"United States v. Young, unreported (S.D. Tex. 1957), 103 Cong. Rec. 14551-52
(daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957); United States v. Parr, unreported (S.D. Tex. 1957), 103
Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957); accord, United States v. Stanley, unre-
ported (N.D. Ga. 1957), 1o3 Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957); United
States v. Clark, unreported (W.D. Pa. 1957), 103 Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug.
26, 1957); United States v. Erie County Malt Beverage Distributing Association,
unreported (W.D. Pa. 1957), 1O3 Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957). Contra,
United States v. Vasquez, unreported (D. P.R. 1957), io5 Cong. Rec. 14553 (daily
ed. Aug. 26, 1957).
r 0United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Parr,
unreported (S.D. Tex. 1957), 103 Cong. Rec. 14552 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957). Cf.
United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D. N.J. 1957).
mCommunist Party of the United States of America v. Subversive Activities
Control Board,-F.2d-, - (D.C. Cir., Jan. 9, 1958).
'4Pub. L. No. 269, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3500 (Sept. 2, 1957), i8 U.S.C.A.
§ 35oo. See United States v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842, 848-54 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
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matter of right.53 With regard to (3), however, Justice Brennan's
declaration that statements should be submitted to the defendant
rather than to the trial judge has been modified to provide that de-
livery shall be made directly to the defendant only in the event that
the entire contents of the witness' prior statement are conceded by
the Government to relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness.54 If, on the other hand, "the United States claims that
any statement ordered to be produced under this section contains mat-
ter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of
the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such
statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such de-
livery, the court shall excise the portions of such statement which
do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With
such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such
statement to the defendant for his use." 55 The result is apparently
a compromise between the procedure followed by most federal courts
prior to Jencks and that outlined in Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion. There has also been a legislative variation in procedural point (4).
Refusal by the Government to produce will now give the trial court
a choice of paths to follow rather than taking the drastic step specified
in Jencks-automatic dismissal. The new law requires the trial judge
to strike the entire testimony of the witness whose prior statement is
withheld by the Government, or in the alternative the judge may de-
clare a mistrial, if, in his discretion, such becomes necessary in the
interest of justice.56
The recent Congressional enactment contains one provision which
does not deal with Jencks but in actuality overrules the decision of
Fryer v. United States.57 That case had allowed defendant a right of
discovery under Rule 17(c) broad enough to justify the pre-trial pro-
duction of statements made to the Government by potential adverse
witnesses. The possibility of any further pre-trial disclosure of this
sort has been eliminated by the first sentence of the new act, declaring
that "no statement or report in the possession of the United States
5 3"After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examina-
tion, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to pro-
duce any statement ... of the witness in the possession of the United States which
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified." Pub. L. No. 269,
85 th Gong., ist Sess. § 35oo(b) (Sept. 2, 1957), 18 U.S.C.A. § 35oo(b).
"Id. § 3 5 oo(b).
Id. § 35oo(c). See United States v. Miller, 248 F.2d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 1957).
'Id. § 3 5 00(d).
'72o7 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See text beginning at note 5 supra.
